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Abstract
Cryptocurrencies are a digital medium of exchange with decentral-
ized control that renders the community operating the cryptocurrency its
sovereign. Leading cryptocurrencies use proof-of-work or proof-of-stake
to reach consensus, thus are inherently plutocratic. This plutocracy is
reflected not only in control over execution, but also in the distribution
of new wealth, giving rise to “rich get richer” phenomena. Here, we ex-
plore the possibility of an alternative digital currency that is egalitarian
in control and just in the distribution of created wealth. Such currencies
can form and grow in grassroots and sybil-resilient way. A single currency
community can achieve distributive justice by egalitarian coin minting,
where each member mints one coin at every time step. Egalitarian mint-
ing results, in the limit, in the dilution of any inherited assets and in each
member having an equal share of the minted currency, adjusted by the
relative productivity of the members. Our main theorem shows that a cur-
rency network, where agents can be members of more than one currency
community, can achieve distributive justice globally across the network
by joint egalitarian minting, where each each agent mints one coin in only
one community at each timestep. Specifically, given that the intersec-
tion between two communities is sufficiently large relative to the gap in
their productivity, market forces will cause the exchange rates between
their currencies to converge to 1:1, resulting in distributive justice across
the currency network. Equality and distributive justice can be achieved
among people that own the computational agents of a currency commu-
nity provided that the agents are genuine (unique and singular) [22]. We
show that currency networks are sybil-resilient, in the sense that sybils
(fake or duplicate agents) affect only the communities that harbour them.
Furthermore, if a currency network has a subnet of genuine currency com-
munities, then distributive justice can be achieves among all the owners
of the subnet.
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1 Introduction
Money is nothing but a piece of paper; or a string of bits, perhaps. In modern
history, fiat money is issued and controlled by rulers and governments. Follow-
ing Bitcoin [15], many blockchain-based cryptocurrencies were introduced [16].
Their technology and distributed protocol renders the community operating the
currency to be its sovereign as, unlike in standard computer systems, there is
no third party that may exert control over the system, e.g. shut it down. In
existing cryptocurrencies, however, most control and benefit lies in the hands
of the few – their founders, early adopters, and large stakeholders (e.g. large
“mining pools”) [11].
Our goal here is to explore the possibility of a digital currency that may be
issued by all, where both control and benefit are distributed in an egalitarian
way among the people participating in the creation and use of the currency.
This can be achieved if the parties to the currency are genuine (unique and
singular) agents of the participating people [22], thus excluding sybils. Such a
currency implements distributive justice in the sense that each person enjoys
an equal share of the created currency. As we wish our medium to be scalable,
our further goal is to build this digital currency in a grassroots way. The key,
high-level differences between our proposed digital currency and most existing
cryptocurrencies are outlined below:
• Equality: Leading cryptocurrencies employ either proof-of-work (PoW)
or proof-of-stake (PoS) systems [17]. As such, they are inherently pluto-
cratic, since control over the behavior of the system is positively correlated
with the computing power or amount of currency available to different
parties. A cryptocurrency is egalitarian if control over the execution and
modification of the currency system is shared equally among the parties
to the currency. Such equality can be guaranteed using digital social con-
tracts [2] over genuine identifiers [22].
• Distributive justice: Leading cryptocurrencies do not aim for justice,
distributive or otherwise. Newly minted coins are allocated to parties with
superior computing power (PoW) or larger amounts of currency (PoS). A
cryptocurrency satisfies distributive justice if each agent enjoys an equal
share of the newly created value of the currency. Here, we spell out con-
ditions that give rise to such distributive justice. A single currency com-
munity can achieve distributive justice by egalitarian coin minting, where
each member mints one coin in every time step. Assuming the community
has only genuine members and no sybils, egalitarian minting results, in the
limit, in the dilution of any inherited assets and in each member having an
equal share of the minted currency, adjusted by the relative productivity
of the members. In a currency network, where people can be members of
more than one currency community, egalitarian minting regime in which
each person mints one coin in only one community in each timestep, can
allows market forces can also achieve distributive justice globally across
the network, under conditions we discuss.
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• Grassroots Sybil-Resilience: Leading cryptocurrencies are monolithic,
in that there is one community using the cryptocurrency (e.g., one blockchain
in which the bitcoin transactions are recorded). Here, we aim at a grass-
roots architecture that allows currency communities to form indepen-
dently, allowing people from different communities to trade and exchange
their currencies, and eventually form a currency network that serves as
a joint, grassroots medium of exchange. Our method is sybil-resilient in
that sybils in a currency network affect only the currency communities
that harbour them.
In this paper we study the possibility of designing an egalitarian and just dig-
ital currency that may form currency networks in a grassroots manner. One key
challenge in this task is the presence of fake and duplicate identities, aka sybils,
that may be employed by their operators in order to tilt control and wealth in
their favor. We first observe that sybils cannot penetrate small communities
of people that know and trust each other and that, indeed, trust communities
can grow in a sybil-resilient way by employing graph-based properties [19] of
genuine identifiers [22], using various mechanisms as admission rules to the com-
munity [23], or utilizing some machine learning algorithms [9]. In particular,
our paper may be viewed as means for a joint, safe scale-up of these com-
munities, concentrating on the aspect of distributive justice as we rely on the
infrastructure of digital social contracts [2] for equality in execution, and tech-
niques such as mutual sureties [22] and sybil-resilient community expansion [19]
for defending against sybils. Note that, even though digital social contracts [2]
assume asynchronous model of computation, here, for simplicity, we assume a
synchronous model of computation.
We first begin with a single currency and provide a formal definition for a
just distribution among its agents. Intuitively, distributive justice is satisfied if
every member in the currency community is granted, initially, an equal share
of the currency, and may trade its portion as it pleases. Formally, at every
time step, the diluted balance of every agent amounts to its equal share plus its
diluted cashflow up to this point. We then present a richer notion of asymptotic
justice, where distributive justice is reached in the limit. With this notion,
distributive justice can be reached even if agents begin with different initial
amounts of the currency; as such it models distributive justice in the face of
unequal inheritances. To achieve asymptotic justice, the difference between the
diluted balance and cashflow must converge to an equal share of the currency,
but these quantities need not match at all times. We show that this notion of
justice may be realized via egalitarian coin minting, which provides a form of
Universal Basic Income (UBI). That is, each community member minting an
equal amount of coins in every time step results in asymptotic justice, regardless
of the initial balance of the agents and the differences in the time of of joining
the community.
Envisioning different currency communities emerge independently, each em-
ploying their own egalitarian minting regime as describe above, we then analyze
the conditions under which multiple communities, each employing their own
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independent currency, may inter-operate in such a way that, jointly, all genuine
agents in all communities will get an equal share of the joint created value of
all currencies: In other words, we set to investigate the possibility of achieving
global distributive justice in a situation where many independent currencies are
used at once. To this end, we define the notion of a currency network, in which
several currency communities operates simultaneously. The formal definition
of a currency network is given below; in essence, it is a tuple of communities
that employ independent currencies (each a coin belongs to a single currency).
The network structure arises from chain payments via agents that are members
in multiple communities simultaneously. This model is a direct generalization
of credit networks [24, 8, 20, 4, 5]. In order to analyze the dynamics of such
networks and the economic consequences of such dynamics, we apply the free
exchange economy model [14] for the emergence of exchange rates among the
different currencies. Based on these rates, we extend the definition of distribu-
tive justice to a currency network, and provide sufficient conditions under which
distributive justice is satisfied. Importantly, these conditions rely on the cur-
rency volumes being in perfect balance with the marginal rates of substitution
among the currencies. This balance requires calibration with every alternation
in the network structure (i.e., the admission of a new member, etc.), and is thus
hard to maintain without frictionless and efficient trade among the currencies.
With these assumptions, we extend the notion of asymptotic justice to cur-
rency networks. Our main result in this setting provides sufficient conditions
under which asymptotic justice is achieved under an egalitarian minting regime.
That is, in order to obtain distributive justice at the limit, the substantial col-
laboration among the different communities is expressed in jointly ensuring that
every agent may mint one coin of only one currency at every time step. Agents
may choose which coin to mint from the different currency communities in which
they are members. Specifically, our main result shows that exchange rates be-
tween all communities will converge to 1:1 and asymptotic justice would follow,
as long as the following conditions hold:
1. Agents behave myopically, in that each agent mints the highest valued
coin at every time step;
2. The network is efficient, in that agents trade coins in order to maximize
their utilities, causing equilibria to be reached infinitely often;
3. The intersections among two communities is sufficiently large to compen-
sate for the productivity gap between them.
Our focus in this paper is on the economic analysis of such currency networks.
Ultimately, we aim to implement such currencies using digital social contracts,
and show elsewhere [2] social contract schemes for single- and multi-currency
egalitarian minting. Our analysis shows how distributive justice can be achieved
globally in a network of egalitarian and grassroots digital currencies.
Finally, we explore the connection between people and their agents, and
show that if a currency community is genuine that it can achieve distributive
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justice among its owners. In a currency network with a genuine (sybil-free)
subnet, distributive justice can be achieved among all owners of the subnet.
1.1 Organization
After reviewing related work, we proceed with the notion of a single currency
community at Section 2, where we define initial and asymptotic distributive jus-
tice, and discuss means for achieving them. We then address currency networks
at Section 3, where we discuss the emergence of exchange rates via the free
exchange economy model and extend the definitions of justice to this richer set-
ting. Then, at Section 4, we analyze sufficient conditions for asymptotic justice
in a network under an egalitarian minting regime.
1.2 Related Work
Mathematically, the main predecessor for personal currency networks are credit
networks [4, 5, 20, 6, 10, 8], and some of the results and analyses of credit
networks carry over to personal currency networks. The key difference between
credit networks and our newly proposed digital currency networks is that credit
networks assume the existence of an objective measure of value, namely, an
outside currency, whereas currency networks aim to create an objective measure
of value.
While credit networks inspired some cryptocurrencies, including Ripple [21]
and Stellar [13], they all had to chose an external currency to peg credit to:
Ripple has chosen to provide its own cryptocurrency, XRP, the production of
which is controlled by the Ripple Foundation (who owns the majority of minted
XRP coins), while Stellar chose to be a “stablecoin”, pegging the credit to a
basket of fiat currencies.
Practically, the most related cryptocurrencies are the trust-based currencies
of Circles [3] and Duniter [7]. Both create money through Universal Basic
Income (UBI) to their members. Circles is a smart contract on top of Ethereum
and is still a concept under development. Duniter is a cryptocurrency with an
active community of mostly-French users; it anticipated the idea of egalitarian
coin minting presented here and has a mechanism of sybil-resilience, being an
indication that the conceptual and mathematical framework presented here may
be viable.
A UBI-based currency community is a possibility, as demonstrated by Duniter,
and is consistent with our mathematical model. Here, in particular, we study
joint-UBI regimes, supporting the grassroots formation of multiple currencies;
so we do not only concentrate on a single currency community (like Duniter
and Circles), but anticipates a network, consisting of many such currencies, and
study their joint economic behavior. Indeed, Duniter is not grassroots in the
sense that it does not provide conceptual or architectural foundation for mul-
tiple independent Duniter-like currency communities to form an interoperate,
like we do.
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2 A Currency Community
Here we first describe a cryptocurrency community that is equal and just, pro-
vided it is sybil-free. We expect people to participate in a currency community
via a computational agent, we assume a one-to-one correspondence between
people and the agents and refer to the computational agents as “it”. Hence,
Such a sybil-free community may be simply a small-scale community in which
all agents know and trust each other, or a larger-scale community that grows
in a sybil-resilient way [22, 19]. We first define such a currency community for-
mally, and analyze economic properties of its dynamics, showing in particular
that distributive justice can be achieved in the limit using an egalitarian minting
regime in which each agent mints a single coin in each timestep. A digital social
contract for egalitarian minting is described elsewhere [2].
Definition 1 (Currency Community). A Currency Community is a tuple C =
(V,C, h), where V is a set of agents, C is a set of fungible coins, and h : C −→ V
is a configuration function that indicates the holder of each coin h(c) ∈ V .
Coins are fungible in the sense defined below. We shall also use the inverse
function h−1(v) := {c ∈ C | h(c) = v} to denote the coins held by agent v ∈ V .
We regard the currency as a medium of exchange for goods and services.
The fundamental operation in a currency is a payment, i.e., the transfer of a
coin from a payer to a payee.
Definition 2 (Payment). Let C = (V,C, h) be a currency community and let
u, v ∈ V . A payment from u to v is a transfer from u to v of a coin c ∈ C,
initially held by u. The result of such a payment, denoted by C pay(c,u,v)−−−−−−→ C′, is
the currency community C′ = (V,C, h′), in which:
h′(x) :=
{
v if x = c ,
h(x) otherwise .
We observe that payments are reversible.
Observation 1 (Reversibility in a Single Currency). If C is a currency com-
munity and C pay(c,u,v)−−−−−−→ C′, then C′ pay(c,v,u)−−−−−−→ C.
Proof. By Definition 2, exchanging a coin back and forth results in the initial
configuration.
2.1 A Currency Community History
We wish to better understand the economic properties of a currency community,
in particular, to explore the possibility of achieving distributive justice within
the community. To this end, and since we envision a digital currency built with
the currency community model in its core, we take the following approach: As
the economy of a currency community takes place in a dynamic setting, where
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agents trade coins with each other for goods and services, we consider currency
community dynamics.
We assume a dynamic setting with discrete time steps, where coins may be
minted periodically by the agents. We mention that this can be implemented
by a digital social contract [2] among the participants. We note that while the
formal model digital social contracts, as well as any feasible realization of it, are
asynchronous, we nevertheless assume a synchronous setting as a simpler first
step, in particular a notion of time is needed for egalitarian coin minting.
Definition 3 (Currency Community History). A currency network history is
a sequence of currency communities C0, C1, C2, . . ., Ct = (Vt, Ct, ht), t > 0, with
the following monotonic attributes:
• Agent growth: Vt ⊆ Vt+1 for all t ≥ 0.
• Coin growth: Ct ⊆ Ct+1 for all t ≥ 0.
That is, intuitively, we assume that the coin configuration may vary and that
new agents and new coins may be added over time. We leave natural extensions
and generalizations of these dynamics (i.e., to accommodate agent departures,
coin burns, etc.) for future research.
For the analysis of currency community histories, we employ the notation
V :=
⋃
t Vt to denote all agents throughout history, and define the following.
Definition 4 (Balance, Income, Revenues and Expenses). Let C0, C1, C2, . . ..
denote a currency community history. Then, we define the following:
• Balance: The balance of agent v at time t is the number of coins held by
v at that time, denoted by:
bt(v) = |h−1t (v)| .
• Income: The income of agent v at time t is the number of newly minted
coins held by v, denoted by:
mt(v) = |h−1t (v) ∩ (Ct \ Ct−1)| .
• Revenue: The revenue of agent v at time t is the number of coins in Ct−1
that were added to v’s account due to trade, denoted by:
revt(v) = |(h−1t (v) ∩ Ct−1) \ h−1t−1(v)| .
• Expenses: The expenses of agent v at time t are the number of coins
subtracted from v’s account due to trade, denoted by:
expt(v) = |h−1t−1(v) \ h−1t (v)| .
The relations between these notions are formally expressed in the following:
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Observation 2. For every t > 0 we have
mt(v) + revt(v)− expt(v) = bt(v)− bt−1(v) . (1)
Proof. As h−1t−1(v) ⊆ Ct−1, we have
mt(v) + revt(v) = |h−1t (v) ∩ (Ct \ Ct−1)|
+ |(h−1t (v) ∩ Ct−1) \ h−1t−1(v)|
= |h−1t (v) \ h−1t−1(v)|
It follows that mt(v) + revt(v)− expt(v) equals
|h−1t (v) \ h−1t−1(v)| − |h−1t−1(v) \ h−1t (v)|
= |h−1t (v)| − |h−1t−1(v)|
= bt(v)− bt−1(v) .
This finishes the proof.
Summing up, we conclude the following:
Corollary 1. For every t > 0 we have
bt(v) = b0(v) +
t∑
s=1
(
mt(v) + revt(v)− expt(v)
)
. (2)
That is, the balance of an agent equals its initial endowment plus its income
and cash-flow up to this point.
2.2 Justice in a Single Currency
Given the above definitions and observations, we now formally define our desired
property of distributive justice, in which, intuitively, every agent is granted an
equal share of the currency. We then demonstrate monetary regimes which
realize distributive justice. The fundamental definition of a just currency is the
following:
Definition 5 (Distributive Justice). A currency community history is said to
be just, if for every t ≥ 0 and v ∈ Vt:
bt(v)
|Ct| =
1
|Vt| +
∑t
s=1
(
revs(v)− exps(v)
)
|Ct| .
That is, the diluted balance of each agent equals its diluted cash-flow plus
an equal share of the currency.
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Intuitively, a just currency grants an equal share of the currency to every
community member, regardless of their inputs, while allowing them to do with
their share as they please. This results in a socially just allocation of the cur-
rency, which is offset from equality only by voluntary trade.
Observation 3 (Equal Birth Grant). Consider a currency community history
where each agent receives a fixed number of coins when it joins the community.
Formally, b0(v) = x > 0 for all v ∈ V0 and
mt(v) =
{
x if v ∈ Vt \ Vt−1
0 else
.
Such an equal birth grant regime is just, as it satisfies
b0(v) +
∑t
s=1mt(v)
|Ct| =
x
x · |Vt| =
1
|Vt| .
Next, we define a relaxed notion of distributed justice.
Definition 6 (Asymptotic Justice). A currency community history is said to
be asymptotically just, if
lim
t
(
bt(v)
|Ct| −
∑t
s=1
(
revs(v)− exps(v)
)
|Ct|
)
=
1
|V | .
That is, the difference between the diluted balance of each agent and its
accumulative diluted cash-flows converges to an equal share of the currency’s
equity.
Intuitively, Definition 6 aims to capture justice “in the limit”. We note that
Definition 6 is weaker then Definition 5, that is, a currency community that
satisfies distributive justice is also asymptotically just.
Remark 1. Importantly, we note that both Definitions 5 and 6 heavily rely on
the the currency history being monotone (see Definition 3). A formal definition
of justice in the (very realistic) case of non-monotone histories, as well as the
means for achieving it in a setting where agents may die or depart from a
community, would be more subtle. In this paper we refrain from these questions,
which include community taxes and inheritance issues, and leave them for future
research.
As demonstrated in Observation 3, coin minting may serve as means to
achieve distributive justice. In the context of asymptotic justice, we discuss a
natural minting regime, termed egalitarian minting regime, in which each agents
obtain equal income in the form of new coins minted periodically.
Definition 7 (Egalitarian Minting). A currency community history is said to
employ egalitarian minting, if at every step every agent mints the same amount
of coins. Formally,
mt(v) =
|Ct \ Ct−1|
|Vt|
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for every t > 0 and v ∈ Vt.
Note that egalitarian minting might be realized using a simple digital social
contract, as demonstrated by Cardelli et al. [2].
The following lemma specifies sufficient conditions under which egalitarian
minting is asymptotically just.
Lemma 1. A currency community history that employs egalitarian minting
with |Ct| −→ ∞ and |V | = N <∞ is asymptotically just.
Proof. Fix v ∈ V . By Equation 2, we have
bt(v)
|Ct| =
b0(v)
|Ct| +
∑t
s=1ms(v)
|Ct| +
∑t
s=1
(
revs(v)− exps(v)
)
|Ct| . (3)
As |Ct| −→ ∞, the first summand approaches zero when t −→∞.
We now focus on
∑t
s=1ms(v). Assume that v joined the community at time
t′, i.e., v ∈ Vt′ \ Vt′−1 and fix t ≥ t′. By Definition 7, we have
t∑
s=1
ms(v) =
t∑
s=t′
|Cs \ Cs−1|
|Vs| ≥
t∑
s=t′
|Cs \ Cs−1|
N
=
|Ct| − |Ct′−1|
N
.
On the other hand, consider a time step t′′ with |Vt′′ | = N and fix t ≥ t′′.
We then have
t∑
s=1
ms(v) ≤
t′′−1∑
s=1
|Cs \ Cs−1|
|Vs| +
t∑
s=t′′
|Cs \ Cs−1|
|Vs|
≤ t′′ · |Ct′′ |+ |Ct| − |Ct
′′−1|
N
.
As |Ct′ |, |Ct′′ | are constant and |Ct| −→ ∞, we conclude that∑t
s=1ms(v)
|Ct| −→
1
N
.
It now follows that
lim inf
t
bt(v)
|Ct| =
1
N
+ lim inf
t
∑t
s=1
(
revs(v)
|Ct|
and
lim sup
t
bt(v)
|Ct| =
1
N
+ lim sup
t
∑t
s=1
(
revs(v)
|Ct| .
The claim follows.
10
To summarize, above we showed that a single, sybil-free currency commu-
nity that employs egalitarian minting is asymptotically just, namely, as time
advances, each member indeed approaches being awarded with an equal share
of the currency, offset only by its voluntary trades. This result is a first step to-
wards the goal of the next section, in which we study the economic relationship
between several such currency communities.
3 Currency Networks
The egalitarian minting currency described in Section 2 indeed satisfies equality
and distributive justice, however only for a single, sybil-free community. Recall
that our goal in this paper is a digital currency that is not only equal and just
but also grassroots, in that it can support the bottom-up formation of multiple
currency communities that can interoperate. Indeed, we envision that many
such currency communities may form independently and we wish to analyze
conditions under which all agents in a network of such currency communities
will jointly enjoy distributive justice.
To study the economic interactions between different currency communities,
the novel mathematical structure we study here is a currency network. In this
section we define currency networks and consider some of their important spe-
cial cases, including such that capture credit networks in particular. Similarly
to credit networks, currency networks are based on trust between agents; in
particular, we show that they extend and generalize the well-established models
of debt and credit networks [8, 4, 5, 20].
Definition 8 (Currency Network). A currency network is a tuple of currency
communities CN = {C1, ..., Ck}, Ci = (V i, Ci, hi), with disjoint sets of coins,
Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for every i, j ∈ [k]. The currency network has agents V = ⋃i V i,
coins C =
⋃
i C
i, and a network configuration function h : C −→ V defined by
h|Ci := hi.
In this model, agents may be members in several communities simultane-
ously. In order to grasp the network structure, it is useful to think of a currency
network as a labeled hypergraph CN = (V, {V i}ki=1, h), where agents V =
⋃
i V
i
are the vertices, and currency communities {V i}ki=1 are the hyperedges, and each
vertex v ∈ V is labeled by the coins it holds from all the communities it is a
member of, h−1(v). See Figure 1 for a visual example. We also note that the
special case in which all currency communities are of size 2 corresponds to credit
networks, where the resulting hypergraph is in fact a graph, as every community
is manifested as an edge.
As in a single currency, the fundamental operation in a currency network is
a (direct) payment, i.e., a transfer of a coin from a payer to a payee (Definition
2); However, a payment of a coin of a currency can only be made among two
members of the coin’s currency community. Still, agents in a currency network
may be able to transact with each other via chain payments, defined below.
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Figure 1: A currency network containing 7 vertices vi, i ∈ [7] and 3 communi-
ties. The blue hyperedge on the left ({v1, v2, v5}) represents the vertices V 1 of
community C1, the red hyperedge at the bottom represents the vertices V 2 of
C2, and the green hyperedge on the right represents the vertices V 3 of C3. The
agent corresponding to v5 holds the coins c1 of C
1 as well as the coin c2 of C
2,
while the agent corresponding to v4 holds the coin c3 of C
3.
Definition 9 (Chain Payment). Let CN = {C1, ..., Ck} be a currency network,
u, v ∈ ⋃i V i. A chain payment from u to v is a sequence of direct payments
CN j
pay(cj ,uj ,uj+1)−−−−−−−−−−→ CN j+1, from uj to uj+1, j ∈ [0,m − 1], where u = u0,
v = um, and CN = CN0.
Note that it is not the same coin that is transferred among the agents par-
ticipating in a chain payment.
Observation 4. A chain payment from u to v may occur as a contiguous block
of transitions if there is a path p0 = (u0, u1, . . . , um), u = u0, um = v, for which
each ui holds a coin acceptable to ui+1, i ∈ [0,m− 1].
The next observation states that chain payments in currency networks are
reversible.
Observation 5 (Reversibility in Currency Networks). If CN is a currency
network and CN pay(c,u,v)−−−−−−→ CN ′, then CN ′ pay(c,v,u)−−−−−−→ CN .
Proof. Follows by induction on Observation 1.
3.1 Justice Within a Currency Network
Our main aim is to explore the possibility of distributive justice within a cur-
rency network. In order to do so, we must first address the issue of exchange
rates among the different currencies. For now, we defer the intricate question
of the emergence of exchange rates to the next section, and provide a formal
definition of exchange rates in this setting, denoting by EXij the amount of
coins in Cj that may be traded in CN for a single coin in Ci.
Definition 10 (Coin Exchange Rates). The coin exchange rates of a currency
network CN = {C1, ..., Ck} is given by a matrix EX ∈ Rk×k that satisfies:
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• Currency fungibility: EXii = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
• Arbitrage-free trade: EXij · EXjl = EXil for all 1 ≤ i, j, l ≤ k.
That is, coins within the same currency have equal value, and exchanging
c ∈ Ci to Cj and then to Cl yields the same rate as a direct exchange from Ci
for Cl.
Corollary 2 (Reciprocal rates). Let EX ∈ Rk×k denote a coin exchange matrix
of a currency network CN = {C1, ..., Ck}, then every pair of indices 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k
satisfy:
EXij =
1
EXji
. (4)
Proof. Straightforward from Definition 10.
Given exchange rates of coins and the total number of coins of each currency,
we now define the equity of an agent as the value of its coins as a fraction of
the total value of all currencies within the network.
Definition 11 (Fractional Equity of Agent). Let EX ∈ Rk×k denote a coin
exchange matrix of a currency network CN = {C1, ..., Ck}. The fractional equity
of agent v ∈ V is given by
Eq(v) :=
∑
i b
i(v) · EXij(CN )∑
i |Ci| · EXij(CN )
.
That is, the equity of an agent equals is the fraction of its assets of the total
value of the network, as may be realized in currency Cj .
Remark 2. We note that Definition 11 is independent of the choice of the index
j. To see this, multiply both the nominator and denominator by EXjl(CN t) and
apply the arbitrage free trade property (see Definition 10).
As in the case of a single currency community, our interpretation of distribu-
tive justice relies on the dynamics in the network over time. We thus provide
the notion of a currency network history, defined below.
Definition 12 (Currency Network History). A currency network history is a
sequence of currency networks CN 0, CN 1, CN 2, . . ., CN t = {C1t , ..., Ckt }, such
that Ci0, Ci1, Ci2, . . ., is a currency community history for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
We employ the notation V :=
⋃
i,t V
i
t and C :=
⋃
i,t C
i
t to denote all agents
and all coins in the network throughout history.
In short, a currency network history is nothing but a synchronized set of
distinct community histories. We mention that the coin exchange rates may
vary over time, and thus apply the notation EX(CN t) to differentiate between
exchange rates at different time periods throughout history.
With the notion of network history at hand, we now extend the notion of
distributive justice to a network setting as follows:
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Definition 13 (Distributive Justice in a Network). A currency network history
CN 0, CN 1, CN 2, . . . is said to be just, if for every t ≥ 0 and v ∈ Vt:∑
i
[
bit(v)−
∑t
s=1
(
revis(v)− expis(v)
)]
EXij(CN t)∑
i |Cit | · EXij(CN t)
=
1
|Vt| .
That is, the difference between all assets of an agent and its current cash-
flow, exchanged to currency Cj and diluted properly, results in each agent’s
equity being an equal share of the entire currency network’s equity, at every
time step throughout history. We note that this is a straightforward extension
of Definition 5 which corresponds to the special case k = 1.
Next, we present the notion of asymptotic justice, extended to a network
setting.
Definition 14 (Asymptotic Justice within a Network). A currency network
history CN 0, CN 1, CN 2, . . . is said to be asymptotically just, if for every v ∈ V :∑
i
[
bit(v)−
∑t
s=1
(
revis(v)− expis(v)
)]
EXij(CN t)∑
i |Cit | · EXij(CN t)
−→ 1|V | .
Definitions 14 and 5 for currency networks relate to each other similarly
to the way Definitions 6 and 5 for a single currency community relate to each
other. Distributive justice in a network requires that the difference between all
assets of an agent and its current cash-flow, exchanged to some currency Cj and
diluted properly, converges to an equal share of the currency network’s equity.
Note that Definition 6 corresponds to the special case k = 1.
4 Justice via Joint Egalitarian Coin Minting
Achieving distributive justice within a currency network requires a joint coin
minting regime that is agreeable to all communities in the network. Indeed,
the admission of an agent to one community in a just network must affect
the distribution of wealth in another, and the exchange rates volatility requires
joint efforts in order to maintain distributive justice over time. The joint minting
regime required to achieve that is a natural extension of egalitarian coin minting
to the network setting.
Definition 15 (Joint Egalitarian Minting). A currency network history is said
to employ joint egalitarian minting if at every time step, every agent mints
exactly one coin among all currencies in the network.
Formally, if
∑
im
i
t(v) = 1 for every t > 0 and v ∈ Vt.
We demonstrate elsewhere a social contract joint egalitarian minting in a
currency network [2]. In the following, we explore sufficient conditions under
which joint egalitarian minting naturally gives rise to asymptotic justice within
all agents participating in multiple currencies within the same currency network.
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4.1 Myopic Agents
We begin with the natural question each agent shall ask at each timestep: Which
coin should I mint next? Indeed, there are many possibilities. Here we consider
a simple answer: Always mint the highest-valued coin.
Definition 16 (Most Valued Coin). Let CN = {C1, ..., Ck} be a currency net-
work with coin exchange rates EX ∈ Rk×k. A most valued coin in this setting
is an index i that maximizes EXij over all indices 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Given an agent
v ∈ V , a most valued v-coin is an index i with v ∈ V i that maximizes EXij over
all indices 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
The next definition formalizes the notion of myopic behaviour under egali-
tarian minting in a network.
Definition 17 (Myopic Agents). Let CN 1, CN 2, ... be a network history that
employs joint egalitarian minting. We say that the agents in the network are
myopic if in every time step t, every agent v ∈ Vt mints a most valued v-coin
(ties are broken arbitrarily).
4.2 Where do Exchange Rates Come From?
The relations and interactions among the currencies within a network are inher-
ent to the currency network setting. In the following, we present a conceptual
and mathematical framework for the analysis of these interactions which result
in exchange rates among the different currencies. We reason that any relation
among independent currencies is based upon what the currencies represent,
namely actual commodities (e.g., goods and services) that may be purchased
from agents that accept these currencies as payment. Specifically, our analy-
sis focuses on the exchange rates that emerge at equilibrium, with respect to
individual preferences over these underlying commodities. Note that the com-
modities are not represented explicitly in our model; we assume their existence
solely to induce preferences on currencies, which we then take into account.
Formally, given a currency network CN = {C1, ..., Ck}, it will be convenient
to view the balances of all agents as a matrix b ∈ Rn×k, where bi(v) is the
balance of agent v ∈ V in currency Ci (i-balance, for short). We denote the
diluted balances by b˜i(v) = b
i(v)
|Ci| , and assume that every agent v has a preference
relation v over diluted portfolios b˜(v) =
(
b˜i(v)
)
1≤i≤k
∈ [0, 1]k, a vector that
corresponds to a fractional ownership in each currency in the network.
This setting is generally known as a pure exchange economy (see, e.g., [12,
14, 25]). We follow standard practice and assume that the preferences of agent
v are expressed via a convex, continuous, and monotone linear order over [0, 1]k.
Given an initial endowment b˜ ∈ [0, 1]n×k, and assuming that agents may freely
trade currencies with each other, the standard solution concept in this model
is a competitive equilibrium b˜∗ wrt. the preferences {v}v∈V that Pareto dom-
inates b˜. Importantly, a competitive equilibrium establishes not only an alloca-
tion (which is reflected in the balances), but also marginal rates of substitution
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among currencies [18]: A matrix MRS ∈ Rk×k where MRSij denotes the quan-
tity of the currency Cj that an agent can exchange for one (infinitesimal) unit
of currency Ci while maintaining the same level of utility under the equilibrium
b˜∗.
The normalization of the marginal rates of substitution among currencies by
the currency volumes, naturally gives rise to exchange rates among coins within
these currencies. As these rates are induced by individual preferences, we term
them preferences-based exchange rates, formally defined below.
Definition 18 (Preferences-based rates). Let CN ∗ be a currency network in
which the diluted balances matrix b˜∗ form an equilibrium under agents’ prefer-
ences over the currencies. The preferences-based rates between coins in Ci and
Cj is given by
EXij := MRSij · |C
j |
|Ci| . (5)
Remark 3. Note the difference between the marginal rate of substitution
among currencies (denoted by MRS), which relates the effective values of the
two economies underlying the two compared currencies, and the exchange rate
between coins (denoted by EX). In essence, preferences-based coin exchange
rates (EX) are the currency rates (MRS), normalized by the number of coins in
circulation.
The following observation asserts that preferences-based rate are valid coin
exchange rates as specified in Definition 10.
Observation 6. Preferences-based rates satisfy currency fungibility and arbi-
trage free trade.
Proof. As marginal rates of substitution arise in equilibrium, these rates must
satisfy both MRSii = 1 and MRSij · MRSjl = MRSil, or else agents would
benefit from further trade. Applying Definition 18 to these equations completes
the proof.
A key merit of using coins as a medium of exchange (rather than direct trade
in fractions of currencies) lies in the degree of freedom manifested in currency
volumes, as an increase in money supply causes inflation [1]. Put simply, if more
coins are issued for a single currency, this linearly impact the exchange rate of
this currency with other currencies. Roughly speaking, our general approach
builds upon the observation that agent choices in coin minting affect and control
the fractions |C
j |
|Ci| , which in turn affect the coin exchange rates.
We say that the volumes of all currencies are in perfect balance if the ratio
between the number of coins of any two currencies exactly equals the difference
in the marginal rate of substitution among them in equilibrium. We claim next
that if the volumes of a pair of currencies is in perfect balance then a fixed 1:1
coin exchange rate follows.
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Observation 7. Let CN ∗ be a currency network in which the diluted balances
matrix b˜∗ forms an equilibrium under agents’ preferences, and let EX denote
preferences-based coin exchange rates. Then, if two currencies Ci, Cj satisfy
|Ci|
|Cj | = MRSij, it follows that EXij = 1.
Proof. Straightforward from Definition 10.
4.3 All Together Now
Following Observation 7, our aim is to establish 1:1 exchange rates by reaching
perfect balance among currency volumes. Our approach builds upon on the
dynamics of the trade within the network, as reflected in the network’s history.
While individual preferences may potentially vary in time, in the following we
consider the simple scenario of fixed agents’ preferences, where {v}v∈V is fixed
eventually, namely after some finite prefix of the currency history in which it
may fluctuate.
Finally, we rely on the efficiency of the network, namely, the tendency of
reaching equilibria wrt. the agents’ preferences via voluntary mutual trade. In-
deed, not all configurations throughout history necessarily form an equilibrium:
in particular, it might take several time steps for agents to perform all profitable
coin trades and arbitrages. We thus define an efficient history as such that gives
rise to equilibria infinitely often.
Definition 19 (Efficient History). Let CN 0, CN 1, CN 2, . . . be a currency net-
work history with agents’ individual preferences over its currencies. Such net-
work history is said to be efficient if there exists an (infinite) subsequence
t1 < t2 < t3 . . . such that CN ti is in equilibrium wrt. to these preferences.
Following that line, we now extend the notion of marginal rates of substitu-
tion (and consequently, also preferences-based rates) to all time periods (possibly
excluding a finite prefix) by defining the rate at time t as the exchange rate at
t∗, where t∗ is the most recent equilibrium that precedes t. That is, we assume
constant rates that are updated infinitely often whenever the network reaches
equilibrium.
With the above notions at hand, we can now state our main theorem:
Theorem 1. Let CN 0, CN 1, CN 2, . . . be a currency network history with 2 com-
munities C1, C2 that employs joint egalitarian coin minting. Assume:
• Fixed agents’ preferences over the currencies.
• Preference-based coin exchange rates.
• Agents are myopic.
• Network history is efficient.
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Then, if it holds that
|V 1 \ V 2|
|V 2| ≤ limt MRS12(CN t) ≤
|V 1|
|V 2 \ V 1| ,
then the network history is asymptotically just. Furthermore, it also follows that
lim
t
EX12(CN t) = 1 .
The proof follows the observation that the agents in the intersection V 1∩V 2
are the only agents that can choose which coin to mint, and, with myopic joint
egalitarian minting, they would choose the more valuable coin; thus, if there
are relatively enough agents in the intersection, then, together, they would mint
enough coins to set the coin exchange rate right, and asymptotic justice then
follows.
Proof. Let at := #{1 ≤ s ≤ t : EX12(CN t) ≥ 1} denote the number of time
steps until t where coins in C1 were more valuable then coins in C2. As agents
are assumed to be myopic, at every such time step all agents in |V 1 ∩ V 2| had
minted a coin in C1. It follows that
|C1t |
|C2t |
=
t · |V 1 \ V 2|+ at · |V 1 ∩ V 2|
t · |V 2 \ V 1|+ (t− at) · |V 1 ∩ V 2|
=
|V 1 \ V 2|+ att · |V 1 ∩ V 2|
|V 2 \ V 1|+ (1− att ) · |V 1 ∩ V 2|
.
As |V
1\V 2|
|Vj | ≤ limt MRS12(CN t) ≤
|V 1|
|Vj\V 1| , it follows that there exists a
unique 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 for which
lim
t
MRS12(CN t) = |V
1 \ V 2|+ x · |V 1 ∩ V 2|
|V 2 \ V 1|+ (1− x) · |V 1 ∩ V 2| .
Now, if att < x, it follows that
|C1t |
|C2t | < limt MRS12(CN t), hence, sufficiently
large t satisfies:
EX12(CN t) = MRS12(CN t) · |C
j
t |
|Cit |
> 1 .
That is, C1 is more valuable then C2 and thus at+1t+1 > att .
Similarly, att > x corresponds to time steps where C2 is more valuable, and
at+1
t+1 <
at
t . We conclude that
at
t is monotonically increasing when below x
and monotonically decreasing above x. As |at+1t+1 − att | −→ 0, we conclude that
this sequence converges to x. It follows that limt
|C1t |
|C2t | = limt MRS12(CN t), and
therefore
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lim
t
EX12(CN t) = lim
t
MRS12(CN t) · lim
t
|Cjt |
|Cit |
= lim
t
MRS12(CN t) · 1
limt MRS12(CN t) = 1 .
In order to establish asymptotic justice, it is enough to note that for suffi-
ciently large t: (1) The initial endowment of each agent v (or the exact time
of joining each community) is negligible, and (2) Approximate 1:1 rates hold
(EX12(CN t) ∼ 1). It follows that
∑
i
[
bit(v)−
∑t
s=1
(
revis(v)− expis(v)
)]
EX12(CN t)∑
i |Cit | · EX12(CN t)
∼ const + t|C1t |+ |C2t |
∼ const + t
t|V |
−→ 1|V | .
5 Agents and People
All analysis above was done for computational agents. Here are aim to relate the
analysis to people, define the notion of genuine agents and sybils, and explain
in what sense the framework proposed is sybil-resilient.
Definition 20 (Agent Ownership). We assume a domain of people P, a domain
of (computational) agents V, and an ownership relation among them, owns ⊂
P × V, and use owns(p, v) for (p, v) ∈ owns. Given v ∈ V, then p ∈ P is
an owner of v if owns(p, v), and given a set of agents V ∈ V, its owners are
{p | owns(p,v), v ∈ V }.
Our previous work on sybils refers to genuine personal identifiers [22], which
are cryptographic key pairs. To connect it with the current work, assume each
computational agent is associated with a unique key pair, where the public key
identifies the agent and the private key is used to sign agent transactions.
Definition 21 (Genuine Agent and Community). An agent v ∈ V is unique if
owns(p, v) and owns(p′, v) implies p = p′, singular if owns(p, v) and owns(p, v′)
implies v = v′, and genuine if it is unique and singular. A community, or set of
agents, V is genuine if every agent v ∈ V is genuine.
Hence, in a genuine community there is a one-to-one correspondence between
agents and the people that own them.
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We have investigated elsewhere [19, 22] how a community of genuine agents
may grow without letting too many sybils in. The method described in [22] relies
on mutual sureties among agents regarding their genuineness. Importantly, the
methods does not specify what are the implications of violating a surely. A
currency community with egalitarian minting provides a natural answer: An
agent that gave a surety to a sybil in a currency community is liable, at the
very least, to the coins minted by the sybil in this currency. We will explore the
implications of integrating the results of this paper with the results of [19, 22] in
subsequent work. Here we make some preliminary observations on the relation
between people and their computational agents in a currency network.
Clearly, a genuine currency community that achieves distributive justice in
the limit, provides distributive justice in the limit also to the people who own
it. A non-genuine agent v in a community V may hamper distributive justice
among the owners of the community in two ways: If v is not singular in V ,
namely its owner p owns also another agent v′ ∈ V , then p gets more than her
fair share in V . This situation corresponds to a real-world situations in which
people operate fake identities, possibly in addition to their “true” identity. But
even if |V | = |P |, where all agents are singular in V , this does not guarantee
distributive justice. If agent v is singular in V , but is not unique and is owned
by two people p and p′, then these two people together will have a share equal to
that of people who own genuine agents in the community. This may correspond
to a real-world situation where a dependent person p is being exploited by a
person p′ on whom she depends, who unfairly extracts value that should belong
to p. Hence, for a currency community to provide distributive justice in the
limit to its owners, it must be genuine.
We now consider a currency network that employs joint egalitarian minting.
We have two observations. First, if a currency network achieves distributive
justice in the limit, then each genuine community within the network achieves
distributive justice among its owners. In other words, the damage that a sybil
causes to a currency network is local to the community that harbours it. The
reason is as follows: Consider two currency communities, a green currency and
a blue currency, where the green community is genuine and the blue community
is infested with sybils. Now consider an agent v at the intersection of the two
communities. By assumption, v is genuine since it is a member of the green com-
munity. Joint egalitarian minting implies that all agent of the green community
will mint the same number of coins, although members in the intersection of
the green and blue community may mint some blue coins. However, since in
the limit the exchange rate between the green and blue community will be 1 : 1,
the fractional equity of the agents in the intersection will be as if they only
minted green coins. Since the green community is genuine, its owners will also
reach distributive justice in the limit, despite the fact that some member of the
genuine green community are also members of the non-genuine blue community.
Second, consider a currency network that achieves distributive justice in the
limit. If a subnetwork of it is genuine, namely all agents in the sub-network are
genuine, then this subnetwork achieves distributive justice in the limit among
its owners. The reasoning is similar, with the additional note that no person
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can own two agents in distinct currency communities in the subnetwork, lest
these agents not be genuine.
6 Outlook
Here we analyzed the possibility of a digital currency that realizes equality –
there is not a single entity controlling the currency but all genuine agents equally
control the system; distributive justice – all genuine agents (that is, not including
sybils) enjoy an equal share of the value of the digital currency; and grassroots
– several independent communities may freely trade while satisfying joint dis-
tributive justice. Indeed, as we envision bottom-up growth of communities, our
analysis, modeled via currency networks, paves the way for interoperability and
offers the possibility of equality and justice at scale.
In particular, our main result shows that joint egalitarian coin minting (that
is possible to implement using digital social contracts [2] and in which each agent
shall mint only a single coin in each timestep) indeed may lead to pairwise 1:1 ex-
change rates and thus to joint distributive justice among genuine identifiers [22]
on currency networks satisfying certain conditions, most importantly sufficient
intersections between different currency communities.
Next we discuss some future research directions.
6.1 Other Regimes
We analyzed joint egalitarian minting with myopic agents. Here we mention
other possibilities:
• Egocentric minting: Here, every agent mints the coin that maximizes
her private preferences. (Note that this coin depends both on the agent
preferences and on the global exchange rate between coins.)
• Strategic minting: Here, agents are rational and sophisticated, in that
each agent may mint the coin that maximizes its private preferences, tak-
ing other agent choices into account.
• Defensive minting: Here, in each iteration, each agent mints the coin
that it currently has the least among all currencies it is a member of. (This
regime can be specified and thus enforced on its parties via a digital social
contract.)
We leave a detailed study of such possibilities for future work. In particular,
studying – analytically or via computer simulations – which of these possibilities
give rise to 1:1 exchange rate, and what is the rate of convergence, are natural
future research directions.
In particular, issues of liquidity in such networks, which could be the main
motivation for community merges, shall be studied, as well as the extension of
Theorem 1 to networks with more than 2 communities.
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Most importantly is the integration of the two approaches - achieving sybil-
resilient growth [19, 22] of a currency community and a currency network, using
the notion of joint egalitarian coin minting developed here.
Acknowledgements
Ehud Shapiro is the Incumbent of The Harry Weinrebe Professorial Chair of
Computer Science and Biology. We thank the generous support of the Braginsky
Center for the Interface between Science and the Humanities. Nimrod Talmon
was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (ISF; Grant No. 630/19).
References
[1] Robert J Barro. European macroeconomics. Macmillan International
Higher Education, 2007.
[2] Luca Cardelli, Gal Shahaf, Ehud Shapiro, and Nimrod Talmon. Digital
social contracts: A foundation for an egalitarian and just digital society,
2020.
[3] Circles. Circles money system overview, 2018. https://joincircles.net/.
[4] Pranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel, Ramesh Govindan, and Ian Post. Liquidity
in credit networks: A little trust goes a long way. In Proceedings of the
12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 147–156, 2011.
[5] Pranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel, Michael P Wellman, and Bryce Wieden-
beck. Strategic formation of credit networks. ACM Transactions on Inter-
net Technology (TOIT), 15(1):1–41, 2015.
[6] Dd B DeFigueiredo and Earl T Barr. Trustdavis: A non-exploitable on-
line reputation system. In Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-
Commerce Technology (CEC’05), pages 274–283. IEEE, 2005.
[7] Duniter. Duniter. https://duniter.org/en/.
[8] Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, Daniel M Reeves, David M Pennock,
and Ryan Fugger. Mechanism design on trust networks. In International
Workshop on Web and Internet Economics, pages 257–268. Springer, 2007.
[9] Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Mario Frank, and Prateek Mittal. Sybilbelief:
A semi-supervised learning approach for structure-based sybil detection.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 9(6):976–987,
2014.
[10] Dean Karlan, Markus Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat, and Adam Szeidl. Trust
and social collateral. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3):1307–
1361, 2009.
22
[11] Yoad Lewenberg, Yoram Bachrach, Yonatan Sompolinsky, Aviv Zohar, and
Jeffrey S Rosenschein. Bitcoin mining pools: A cooperative game theoretic
analysis. In Proceedings of AAMAS ’15, pages 919–927, 2015.
[12] Robert E Lucas Jr. Asset prices in an exchange economy. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1429–1445, 1978.
[13] David Mazieres. The stellar consensus protocol: A federated model for
internet-level consensus. Stellar Development Foundation, 32, 2015.
[14] James C. Moore. Pure exchange economies. General Equilibrium and Wel-
fare Economics: An Introduction, pages 131–153, 2007.
[15] Satoshi Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system, 2008.
[16] Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew Miller, and
Steven Goldfeder. Bitcoin and cryptocurrency technologies: a comprehen-
sive introduction. Princeton University Press, 2016.
[17] Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew Miller, and
Steven Goldfeder. Bitcoin and cryptocurrency technologies: a comprehen-
sive introduction. Princeton University Press, 2016.
[18] Robert S Pindyck and Daniel L Rubinfeld. Microeconomics, 6. Auflage,
New Jersey, pages 613–640, 2005.
[19] Ouri Poupko, Gal Shahaf, Ehud Shapiro, and Nimrod Talmon. Sybil-
resilient conductance-based community growth. In Proceedings of CSR ’19,
pages 359–371, 2019.
[20] Geoffrey Ramseyer, Ashish Goel, and David Mazieres. Constrained credit
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.02194, 2019.
[21] David Schwartz, Noah Youngs, Arthur Britto, et al. The ripple protocol
consensus algorithm. Ripple Labs Inc White Paper, 5(8), 2014.
[22] Gal Shahaf, Ehud Shapiro, and Nimrod Talmon. Genuine personal identi-
fiers and mutual sureties for sybil-resilient community formation, 2019.
[23] Stephen Sutherland and Dale Wick. Controlled access system for online
communities, August 29 2002. US Patent App. 10/067,962.
[24] Sten Thore. Credit networks. Economica, 36(141):42–57, 1969.
[25] Hal R Varian and Hal R Varian. Microeconomic analysis, volume 3. Norton
New York, 1992.
23
